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ABSTRACT 
This thesis primarily aims to investigate the concept of central bank independence 
with special references to its institutional aspects in political power configurations. 
Thus, following a brief introduction to the theoretical approach of the notion in an 
economic policy design, the institutional position of the central bank independence in 
terms of the power share of the actors in politics are discussed. In order to illustrate 
the subject, the position of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey is questioned. 
As a consequence of the trends in global political economic understandings 
and the failures of the past experiences, the legal independence is granted to the 
CBRT. However, legal independence alone does not refer to the actual central bank 
independence specifically in developing countries where political environment might 
refer much more complexity. Similarly, despite the legal independence of the CBRT, 
its actual independence remained controversial due to its relations with the 
government and the financial actors. The expertise in Central Banking made the 
officials more confident in short-term policy applications, but the view on the CBRT 
in the long-run is distant from being an independent institution that shapes the 
political environment. Instead, it is exposed to the political pressures of the authority. 
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Istanbul Bilgi Universitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü’nde Yüksek Lisans Derecesi için 
Emine Beyza Satoğlu tarafından Kasım 2008’da teslim edilen tezin kısa özeti  
 
Bu tez Merkez Bankası Bağımsızlığı olgusunu kurumsal bir açıdan konunun siyasi 
ve iktisadi boyutlarına referanslar vererek ele almayı amaçlamıstır. Bu nedenle, 
Merkez Bankası Bağımsızlığı meselesi teorik olarak incelenmenin yaninda  konu 
iktisadi politika tasarımlarında siyasi aktörlerin güç ilişkileri eksenine taşınmış ve 
MB Bağımsızlığının kurumlararası yeri paranın toplumsal rolü üzerinden 
tartışılmıştır. Turkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası’nın konumu ve içinde yeraldığı 
güncel tartışmalar bahsedilen iktisat politikası üzerinde etkin olma tartışmasının bir 
örneğidir.  
Küresel politik-iktisat anlayışındaki dönüşümlerin bağımsızlık yönünde bir eğilim 
göstermesi, genel kabul gören makro teoriler ve geçmiş bağımlı Merkez Bankası 
modelinin olumsuz tecrübeleri sonucu TCMB’ye hukuki bağımsızlık hakkı 
tanınmıştır. Fakat, siyasi alanda kargaşa ihtimalinin daha fazla olduğu gelişmekte 
olan ülkelerde hukuki olarak bağımsızlık tanınmış olması çoğu zaman bu ülkelerin 
Merkez Bankalarının ‘gerçekten’ bağımsızlık hakkını kullanabildiği anlamına 
gelmemektedir.  Aynı şekilde, yasal olarak bağımsızlık alanını genişletmiş olan 
TCMB’nin gerçekte ne kadar bağımsız olduğu hükümetle ve finansal aktörlerle 
süregelen ilişkilerine bakıldığında tartışmalıdır. Türkiye örneği, Merkez Bankası 
uzmanlarının  kısa dönemli kararlarını uygulamakta bağımsızlık açısından 
kendilerini daha güvenli hissettiğini, ama uzun dönemli MB politikalari üretmede ve 
kurumsal yapısını korumada siyasi çevreleri yönlendirebilecek kadar bağımsız 
olmağını, hatta siyasi erkin etkisine açık olduğunu göstermektedir.  
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PREFACE 
The topic of this thesis has come into existence as a result of my pursuit of how 
economics which is a field that partially requires technical designership functions in 
an arena of politics  that is prone to populism and where  interest groups fight 
obviously amongst each other. I have recognized Central Banking as a field where I 
could discuss this issue pronouncedly. I had a preassumption without question that 
Central Bank Independence had vital importance at the point where economic 
capabilities are distinguished from the politics. 
Even though I still admire the independence as a phenomenon succeeded in 
macroeconomic measurements, the research process made me believe that it would 
be a huge loss for democracy to repress monetary policy from the checks and 
balances of the democratic accountability while it widely and directly affects the 
society. However, in countries where democracy have not settled down well, due to 
the attitudes of politicians and populist approaches as seen in several developing 
countries CBI occurs in favor of democracy. Hereby, I am whole heartedly 
convinced that setting an institutional approach and making the Central Bank policy 
makers feel responsible is the best orientation. 
CBI phenomenon for inflation targeting has been debated widely during the 
1990’s.The measurement of independence to correlate this notion with inflation and 
production became popular among macroeconomists. Among these debates in 
macroeconomic and law environment political economic analysis on this issue has 
been delayed in Turkey so, there are very few such studies on Turkey. Hence, in this 
study I have not aimed to determine indices for CBI and make macroeconomic 
analysis. The legal problem of this issue as well is beyond my interest except 
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reflections of political relations. Nevertheless, I believe that the institutional 
economic political analysis that I have defined in this study is a contribution in 
this field. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, there has been an accelerated movement towards granting more legal 
authority to the Central Banks: first, due to the successes of highly independent the 
Bundesbank and the Swiss National Bank in maintaining price stability and second, 
the inflationary experiences of the 1970s attributed to the governments’ borrowings 
from the Central Banks that caused the expansionary monetary policies.  
The process of globalization and openness in international markets increased 
the pressures on governments. In addition, the increased volatility and complexity of 
international financial markets resulted in more restrictions on the autonomy of 
national governments in economic decision-making. The political and intellectual 
reason behind the argument for Central Bank independence lies in the context 
described here as well as the lessons taken from the international monetary 
history.(Gökbudak, 2002, p.302) 
 The issues on Central Banks are intrinsically a part of the subjects of the 
politics due to their direct influence on specific socio-economic interest, as a result of 
their position in the state system and their effectiveness in building up their own 
images, resources and the credibility from the society to the economic policies. 
Similarly, the issue of granting legal independence to the Central Banks is also 
highly political that it means abdication of government from a very crucial power. In 
other words, creating an independent Central Bank is a redistribution of powers 
affecting macroeconomic decisions, thus the entire society.  
The issue of Central Bank autonomy is also political in that any move to grant 
them greater autonomy would be an issue for tensions of political-economic forces, 
2 
 
in any national context. The specific tension of these forces and the balance of power 
among them can be eliminated by the increasing globalization of financial markets 
which causes a crisis of national governance. In other words, the subject is political 
since it involves a redistribution of power over key areas of macroeconomic decision. 
(Gökbudak, 2002) 
In this study, Central Bank Independence is briefly analyzed in three aspects 
such as functional independence, financial independence, and the institutional 
independence. The functional independence refers to the capability of the bank in 
application of monetary policy and autonomy on decision making in this regard. 
Financial independence defines the banks resources that exclude financial pressures. 
Finally the institutional independence refers the position of the Central Bank in the 
system of a country’s institutions and procedures. In this respect, institutional 
independence has ties with the governmental tradition and the system of government 
as well as the past experiences seen in the political-economic environment of the 
country. In this study, the basic focus would be the position of institutional 
independence of CBRT to explain its effectiveness in the Turkey’s political-
economic system. These explanations to the notion of Central Bank Independence 
would deliver us to the fact that legal independence alone is not sufficient for actual 
independence while there are differences in each country’s priorities and systems of 
governmental institutions. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INSTITUTIONS, POLITICS and CENTRAL BANKS 
 
 “Most things in life –automobiles, mistresses, cancer - 
are important only to those who have them. Money, in 
contrast, is equally important to those who have it and 
those who don’t.” Galbraith 
 
1.1. What’s money?  
Money is an invention of mankind. The invention of money by the human 
mind is related to the capacity of human being to accord value to symbols. Money is 
a symbol that represents the value of goods and services. In this respect, any object 
accepted as money by the consent of community can be “money”. Thus all money 
reflects socio-psychological bases beside of its economic dimension as a medium of 
exchange. Starting from this point to answer what the money is not a simple 
question. Even the great economist Galbraith, in his comprehensive book on money 
abstains from giving a definition and suggests, “Money is nothing more or less than 
what you always thought it was” (Galbraith, 1977, p.5). 
However, it has significant functions; 
From its emergence as a medium of exchange in a barter economy to today’s 
modern world, money has changed its role and functions with regard to time and 
context.  
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1.1.1. Functions and Evolution of money 
Money has three functions in modern economy, as being a medium of 
exchange, a unit of account and a store of value. (Weatherford, 1997) A medium of 
exchange is anything that is readily acceptable as payment. A unit of account is the 
standard that people uses for prices and record debts. A store of value provides 
people to transfer their wealth from the present to the future. 
After categorizing money by function, the second most important 
categorization is with regard to the form or material from which it is made (Zelizer, 
1994). How money performs its functions is always limited by the form it takes, and 
this can be as varied as paper, sea shells, electronic bits, portions of metal or edible 
commodities such as salt, rum, or cacao.  
Commodity Money: From the days agriculture was discovered to the 
industrialization of the 19th century, money took the form of a commodity -by using 
the suitable commodities- with intrinsic value. From very early days, societies 
preferred metals as money since they served well. Copper, then silver, eventually 
gold was minted. Perishable (eggs, tomatoes), non-divisible (hides), difficult to 
transport (water) or relatively abundant (wheat) goods made bad money.  
Fiat Money: Today all economies in the world have fiat money. Fiat money 
is used as a medium of exchange because of a government decision. Banknotes are 
also called “legal tender” due to government makes a commitment by it. Fiat money, 
which has negligible cost –only printing, and paper or metal- has no intrinsic value.  
Electronic Money: Throughout the twentieth century, the volume of money 
flow increased greatly with the introduction of new means of payment such as credit 
5 
 
cards, the expansion of banking activities, and the introduction of electronic 
communications. Thus, electronic money which enables people to carry more money 
in less volume has been introduced.  
As the form of money changes, the definition of money becomes dynamic 
and changes along the history. Anthropologists have researched the different and 
non-economic ways that people explain money and commercial activity. By relating 
emotional life of the individual, they seek the role of money in the levels of 
satisfaction, accomplishment, and security or its role in social relations. All of these 
works seek a more holistic analysis of money and how it fits with the political, 
religious, psychological, and other cultural aspects of social life. 1 
1.1.2. Institutions and Money 
After discussing its forms and functions of money, new questions such as 
whether it is a social institution or not would come into existence to understand what 
the money is.  
As money has increased in importance in the globalized world economy, 
social scientists have begun research into the importance of money outside the 
economic realm. As human consciousness has evolved, the nature and function of 
money has evolved too. An evolutionary perspective on money traces the social and 
psychological changes in human attitude and collective behavior that made possible 
this historical development. According to Seabright, the importance of money lays its 
                                                 
1  See J. Weatherford “Money: Anthropological Aspects” International Encyclopedia of the 
Social & Behavioral Sciences 
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feature that provide to narrow gulf between ingenuity of each individual and the 
interest of others. That is, money is a social contract. (2004, p. 70) 
 Within the context that highlights money as a social contract, to understand 
what an institution is would be a significant starting point. There are several 
explanations describing this term as formal establishments or organizations. 
However, in social sciences, in general, it can be said that institutions are structures 
and mechanisms of social order and cooperation governing the behavior of 
communities constituted by at least two people. Institutions are identified with a 
social purpose and permanence, transcending individual human lives and intentions, 
and with the making and enforcing of rules governing cooperative human behavior. 
(Grief, 2006) The term, institution, is commonly applied to customs and behavior 
patterns important to a society, as well as to particular formal organizations of 
government and public service.  
As structures and mechanisms of social order among humans, institutions are 
one of the principal objects of study in the social sciences, including sociology, 
political science and economics. Institutions are a central concern for law which is 
the formal regime for political rule-making and enforcement. The development and 
functioning of institutions in society may be regarded as an instance of emergence; 
that is, institutions arise, develop and function in a pattern of social self-organization, 
which goes beyond the conscious intentions of the individual humans. For this 
reason, the creation and evolution of institutions is a primary topic for history 
especially after the rise of the role of human will in shaping structures in historical 
writings in the late 20th century. 
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Social sciences have developed different perspectives to explain institutions2.  
 Sociology traditionally analyzed social institutions in terms of interlocking 
social roles and expectations. Social institutions created and were composed of 
groups of roles, or expected behaviors. The social function of the institution was 
executed by the fulfillment of roles. Basic biological requirements, for reproduction 
and care of the young, are served by the institutions of marriage and family, for 
example, by creating, elaborating and prescribing the behaviors expected for 
husband/father, wife/mother, child, etc. 
 In history, a distinction between eras or periods implies a major and 
fundamental change in the system of institutions governing a society. Political and 
military events are judged to be of historical significance to the extent that they are 
associated with changes in institutions. In European history, particular significance is 
attached to the long transition from the feudal institutions of the Middle Ages to the 
modern institutions, which govern contemporary life. 
Finally, in recent years, the economists focus on a new game-theoretic 
approach to the institutions. Public choice theory, a branch of economics with a close 
relationship to political science, considers how government policy choices are made, 
and seeks to determine what the policy outcomes might be, in a given a particular 
political decision-making process and context. (Buchanan, 2003) Institutions gain 
importance to evaluate the context efficiently. In this purpose, Douglass North the 
                                                 
2For more details, see “Social sciences and institutions” in International Encyclopedia of the 
Social & Behavioral Sciences, Available [online] at: 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/shavell/pdf/12_Inter_Ency_Soc_8446.pdf 
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winner of the 1993 Nobel Prize, made innovative analysis of the role of institutions 
in the economic development of nations. 
For North, institutions are structures that comprise a society's system of 
penalties and incentives. They're established through formal rules such as 
constitutions and the rule of law; and also informal restrictions such as rules of 
behaviour, values, beliefs, customs, religions and codes of conduct; and the 
combination of all of these that are enforced. He establishes that institutions are the 
"rules of the game", and consisting of both the formal legal rules and the informal 
social norms that govern individual behavior and structure social interactions. 
(North, 1996) The "players" of this game are corporations, cooperatives, labor 
unions, the media, NGOs, religious and educational institutions, judges, elected 
officials, political parties and policy-makers. Depending on the type of the rules of 
the game, players are encouraged to adopt different values and attitudes – that is, 
their behaviour may promote institutional change. Efficient institutions reduce 
transaction costs, diminish conflicts and uncertainty, encourage integrity, guarantee 
that property rights are protected and signed contracts are duly observed. In this 
view, the expansion of markets and investments is directly related to the institutional 
formation of a country.   
According to this approach, there are two perspectives to study institutions. 
Firstly, how do institutions survive and evolve? In this perspective, institutions arise 
from Nash equilibrium of games. That is what Seabright described as “tunnel vision” 
for the ultimate cooperation. (2004) Secondly, how do institutions affect behaviour? 
In this perspective, the focus is on behaviour arising from a given set of institutional 
rules.  
9 
 
To sum up, as mechanisms of social cooperation, institutions are manifest in 
both objectively real, formal organizations, such as the National Assemblies or 
Central Banks, and, also, in informal social order and organization, reflecting human 
psychology, culture, habits and customs.  
So, is money an institution?  
As it is seen above, social scientists often analyze the meaning of money in 
institutions outside of the financial and commercial realms. Such analysis examines 
the functions, importance, and role in noncommercial spheres of life such as its 
social or psychological meaning. 
Money is an institution that encompasses many formal organizations, 
including banks and government treasury departments and stock exchanges. By these 
organizations it is the "institution" which guides people in their pursuit of personal 
economic well-being and wealth. All these webs are self-organized around the 
existing of trust emerged from people’s intentions for cooperation. Powerful 
institutions are able to imbue a paper currency with certain value, and to persuade 
millions into cooperative production and trade in usage of that currency's units.  
The ‘meaning’ of money may be found in the abstract role of money in social 
institutions, or it may refer to the differential impact of wealth and poverty or in the 
lives of individual people or groups when money is absent or abundant. The 
evolution of money illustrates how each new social institution creates linkages with 
other existing social institutions as it develops and those linkages gradually expand 
into complex networks of relationships. 
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   1.2. What’s Central Bank?  
“This currency, as we manage it, is a wonderful 
machine. It performs its office when we issue it; it pays and 
clothes Troops and provides Victuals and Ammunition; and 
when we are obliged to issue a Quantity excessive, it pays itself 
off by Depreciation.”3 Benjamin Franklin, on the mystery of 
money for politics  
 
1.2.1 Central Banking 
General money arose as a political creation of the state to organize and 
control commerce and to standardize taxation. Central Banks are institutions 
emerged to operate money for the public welfare and not for maximum profit and 
they are charged with regulating the size of a nation's money supply, the availability 
and cost of credit, and the foreign-exchange value of its currency. The principal 
objectives of a modern Central Bank in carrying out these functions are to maintain 
monetary and credit conditions and to contribute a high level of employment and 
production, and to achieve a reasonably stable level of domestic prices, and an 
adequate level of international reserves.  
Central Banks also have other important functions. These include acting as 
fiscal agent of the government, supervising the operations of the commercial banking 
system, clearing checks, administering exchange-control systems, serving as 
correspondents for foreign Central Banks and official international financial 
institutions. Furthermore, for Central Banks of the major industrial nations 
participating in cooperative international currency and related arrangements designed 
                                                 
3 Letter to Samual Cooper, April 22, 1779 in “the writings of Benjamin Franklin” Albert 
Henry Smyth, ed. (New York Macmillan co. , 1906), vol VII, p. 294. (Galbraith, 1975) 
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to help stabilize or regulate the foreign-exchange rates of the participating countries 
are also tasks.  
The principles of Central Banking grew up in response to the recurrent 
British financial crises of the 19th century and were adopted in other countries. 
Modern market economies are subject to frequent fluctuations in output and 
employment. Although the causes of these fluctuations are various, there is general 
agreement that the ability of banks to create new money may worsen them. Although 
an individual bank may be cautious enough in maintaining its own liquidity position, 
the expansion or contraction of the money supply to which it contributes may be 
excessive. (Lippi, 1999) This raises the need for a disinterested outside authority able 
to view economic and financial developments objectively and to exert some measure 
of control over the activities of the banks. Despite its difficulty, a Central Bank 
should also be capable of acting to offset forces originating outside the economy. 
               Prior to the 20th century there had been no clearly defined “Central 
Banking” concept. For De Kock (1954), although there was a gradual evolution 
towards the Central Banks, a systematic and consistent technique has not been 
formulated.  The free banking school has argued that the very existence of a Central 
Bank is not necessary or desirable while Cartalists argued that the issue and control 
of money is a natural and central aspect of sovereignty.  As the state pre-empts the 
issue by establishing legal tender fiat money it need an institution to manage the 
value of that money. The institution would be a Central Bank. Historically, the 
second view was supported more enthusiastically. In the 20th century, while on the 
one hand Keynesian economics have risen; on the other hand the foundations of 
Central Banks have accelerated. 
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1.2.2 History of Central Banks 
The earlier established Central Banks were founded as special commercial 
banks rather than as non-profit maximizing public sector institutions. However, they 
were in each case special since they were made the government’s main banker and 
received monopolistic privileges. (note issue) The basis of commercial banking is the 
maintenance of convertibility of bank liabilities.  
Table.1. Central Banking Institutions established prior to the 20th century  
Bank Founded Monopoly note 
issue 
Lender of last 
resort (decade) 
Sverige Riksbank 1668 1897 1890 
Bank of England 1694 1844 1870 
Banque de France 1800 1848 1880 
Bank of Finland 1811 1886 1890 
Nederlandsche Bank 1814 1863 1870 
Austrian National Bank 1816 1816 1870 
Norges Bank 1816 1818 1890 
Danmarks Nationalbank 1818 1818 1880 
Banco de Portugal 1846 1888 1870 
Belgian National Bank 1850 1850 1850 
Banco de Espana 1874 1874 1910 
Reichsbank 1876 1876 1880 
Bank of Japan 1882 1883 1880 
Banca D’Italia 1893 1926 1880 
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* The table excludes Central Banking institutions of the Netherlands Antilles 
(est.1828), Indonesia (1828), Bulgaria (1879), Romania (1880) and Serbia (1883). 
Source: Capie et. al., 1994,  p.6  
In many of the old countries one bank gradually came to assume more and 
more the position of a Central Bank by enjoying the sole or the principle right of note 
issue and acting as the government’s banker and agent. The regulations of the note 
issue were imposed by the State. They were not generally called as Central Banks but 
known as banks of issue or as national banks. 
The Riksbank of Sweden which was opened in 1668 with help from Dutch 
businessmen was the first established Central Bank, but the Bank of England 
founded in 1694, was the first bank of issue to assume the position of a Central Bank 
and was developed in the way of recognized fundamentals of the Central Banking. 
Its history illustrates the evolution of the principles and techniques of the Central 
Banking. Successively, Bank of France was established in 1800 while Bank of Japan 
was founded in 1882.  
At the beginning of the 20th century all the countries of the New World and 
China and India were still without Central Banks. The international financial 
conference held in 1920 at Brussels passed a resolution affecting all countries that 
had not yet have a Central Bank. It addressed to the importance of having a Central 
Bank for stability in monetary and banking system and, indeed, for the interest of 
world co-operation.  
The following years beginning from the establishment of the South African 
Reserve Bank in 1921, there were foundations of Central Banks in all parts of the 
world. The People's Bank of China evolved its role as a Central Bank starting in 
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about 1979 with the introduction of market reforms in that country. The European 
Central Bank established in 1998 is the most modern bank model and was introduced 
with the euro to coordinate the European National Banks. 
Today, Central Banks has become a cult (Deane and Pringle, 1995, p.1) that 
each country or group of countries in the world posses a Central Bank, even 
emerging democracies in various regions of the world. Central Banking has become 
an entirely separate branch of banking with its distinctive functions and operations of 
commercial banks. Thus, Central Banks have developed their own code of rules and 
practices, in other words “the art of Central Banking”. 
How and why the status and real influence of Central Banks have risen over 
the past years? According to Deane and Pringle (1995, p.2), there are three basic 
factors, and most importantly the economic priorities of the big powers that made 
monetary policy the only game of the town gave a rise of the role of the Central 
Banks. Secondly the initiatives to establish new Central Banks to be attached in 
market economies and finally the need of deregulated globalized and technologic 
financial markets to be regulated by an authority demonstrates why the Central 
Banks’ influences have increased. 
1.2.3. The History of FED4 
Due to certain influence of American macroeconomic policies over the rest of the 
world economies, particularly on monetary systems, in addition to its capability to 
demonstrate related arguments of emergence of a Central Banking, I would denote 
the story of how the FED (Federal Reserve Banking) has emerged. 
                                                 
4 For a whole story, see FED’s webpage at: www.federalreserve.org 
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After Alexander Hamilton advocated the creation of a Central Bank, the First 
Bank of the United States was established in 1791. The capital stock of the bank was 
subscribed by both federal government and the private individuals. Hence, directors 
had also chosen by both groups. It was a nationwide bank that performed the basic 
banking functions. However, by influencing both American commerce and the 
federal government, it became frightening to many people that it expired in 1811. 
In 1816 Second Bank of the United States was introduced in Congress. The 
Second Bank of the United States organizationally was similar to the first the charter 
was to run for 20 years, one-fifth of the stock was owned by the federal government 
and one-fifth of the directors were appointed by the President. However, similar to 
the first one, many citizens, politicians and businessmen perceived it as a menace to 
both themselves and U.S. democracy. As a result of the opposition of the President 
Jackson the banks lost the public support, and when the charter of the Second Bank 
of the United States expired in 1836, it was not renewed.  
For the following decades, America's Central Banking was carried on by a 
mix structure of state-chartered banks with no federal regulation. However, this lack 
of a Central Banking authority hurt the stability of the American economy. Bank 
notes, issued by the individual banks, varied widely in reliability and the need for a 
Central Bank entity had revealed. Ultimately, the national banking legislation of the 
1860s proved inadequacy of monetary policies due to the absence of a Central 
Banking structure.  
While America's industrial economy grew and became more complex 
towards the end of the 19th century, the weaknesses in the banking system became 
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critical and triggered economic depressions. After the severe depressions forcing 
several banks into failure in 1893 and 1907, many Americans persuaded that their 
banking structure was out of date and needs a major reform. During the following 
years, the Senate was charged with making a comprehensive study for the necessary 
and desirable changes to the banking system of the United States. The election of 
Woodrow Wilson as President in 1912 also accelerated the process on financial 
reform. Wilson supported this idea, for the creation of twenty or more privately 
controlled regional reserve banks; but also insisted upon the creation of a central 
board to control and coordinate the work of the regional reserve banks which would 
hold a portion of member banks' reserves, perform other Central Banking functions 
and issue currency against commercial assets and gold. The American Congress in 
1913, approved that the twelve Federal Reserve banks were established to cover 
various districts throughout the United States operating under a supervisory board in 
Washington, D.C. 
1.3. Central Bank as a modern institution 
The modern Central Bank has had a long evolution, tracing from the 
establishment of the Bank of Sweden in 1668. In the process, Central Banks have 
become varied in authority, autonomy, functions, and instruments of action. By the 
rise of Keynesian policies in everywhere, there has been a vast and explicit 
broadening of central-bank responsibility for promoting domestic economic stability 
and growth and for defending the international value of the currency. There also has 
been increased emphasis on the interdependence of monetary and other national 
economic policies, especially fiscal and debt-management policies. On the other 
hand, a widespread belief of the need for international monetary cooperation has 
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evolved, and Central Banks have played a major role in developing the institutional 
arrangements that have given form to such cooperation.  
 
1.3.1. Macro policy objectives of Central Banks  
For much of the industrialized world the gold standard has been established 
as the main exchange rate regime. There was a single overriding objective under this 
standard that to maintain the convertibility of the currency into gold and this 
objective is accepted as the proper basis for a stable, well-functioning, laissez-faire, 
financial system. By the war in 1914 waves of shock to financial markets have 
damaged the stability of system. Gold was withdrawn from circulation and replaced 
by paper money. The monetary policy authorities in each country review the 
objectives and under the leadership of UK, they decided to protect the status quo. 
However, the collapse of international monetary order in the early 1930s left 
Central Banks without an external objective and the fragility of the economy 
indicated little need to maintain domestic constraints. Finally, due to the Keynes’ 
influence, both short and long falling nominal interest rates were used by the CBs for 
recovery.  After the Second World War, the Keynes rhetoric extended the objectives 
of the Central Banks to high employment and growth. For full employment and 
higher production levels, monetary policy has been used and in this respect the 
relation of Central Banks to the governments became closer.  In most cases, in 
practice the Central Bank became a branch of the Treasury. Furthermore, due to the 
Bretton-Wood’s peg system, each country’s external position determined whether it 
would tighten monetary or fiscal policies or to expand them. The shocks of the late 
1960s and early 1970s –Vietnam War, OPEC- broke the system. The short-run trade 
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off between employment and inflation along the Philips Curve had dramatically 
worsened. Focusing demand management for price stability became the main 
objective, thus, Central Banks began to use their policy instruments in this way. 
1.3.2. The policy instruments of Central Banks 
The control of money supply called as monetary policy is maintained by the 
Central Banks. Central Banks have variety of instruments for achieving their 
monetary objectives. 
• Open Market Operations: OMOs are the most important way for most 
Central Banks to achieve money supply control and it refers to the 
purchase or sale of bonds by the CB in the bond market.  
• FX Operations: In many countries, buying and selling foreign 
exchange is another way to control money supply. 
• Changing the Reserve Ratio: Changing the reserve requirements of 
the banks affects to the money multiplier, thus the money supply.  
• Changing the Discount rate: This is the most widely used tool for 
developed countries. Discount rate is the minimum interest rate for 
short-term loans charged by the CB for banks. 
 
1.3.3. Why are institutions important for monetary policy?  
 
As mentioned in the first section, institutions gain importance in academic studies of 
the economists. It is in the context of credibility problems that many economic policy 
analyses highlighted a new role for economic institutions. That institutions influence 
policy choices and provide a higher degree of commitment to other discretionary 
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policies.  This is not mean that institutions are immutable. But, they are slower to 
change than ordinary policy choices. That is, institutions have a significant role to 
prevent the implementation of undesirable policies, while helping to sustain the 
implementation of desirable ones.  
As Rodrik stated, democracy is “a meta-institution for building good 
institutions” (1999, p.3) and its institutions perform better when they faced to shocks. 
In addition, for a transformation in the economic sphere to be successful stable social 
institutions as the institutions for macroeconomic stabilization, the institutions of 
conflict management, the regulatory institutions and so forth is necessary and this 
transformation should support the effect of the economic reforms. (Rodrik, 1999, p. 
5) If the institutions are constraints that human beings impose on themselves (North, 
1990, p. 3) and if they function to decrease the insecurity of life, then Central Bank is 
an institution that would function to stabilize macro economic shocks while 
governments need to be constrained. As known, in a sound institutional environment 
for Central Banks there is no worry about for discrepancy between what Central 
Banks claim and what they do. However, as the institutionalist Oliver Williamson 
has shown, because of the work of interest groups, numerous institutions are 
"inefficient by design". Such entities increase uncertainty and conflict, and hike the 
cost of transactions. Thus, avoiding inefficient institutional design would lead better 
performance in economic sphere, in addition to the democratic environment.  
In this purpose, according to Lippi (1999) the characterization of the political 
“context” in Central Bank analyses is a key dimension. The political aspects of the 
issue can be related to the “representative-agent” problem due to the lack of perfect 
monitoring. In such contexts the politicians with ideological and opportunistic 
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motives may use the monetary policy choices. The associated “time-inconsistency” 
problem can be overcome by setting up politically independent Central Banks.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
 
‘‘Institutions cannot absolutely prevent an undesirable 
outcome, nor ensure a desirable one, but the way that they 
allocate decision-making authority within the public sector 
makes some policy outcomes more probable and others less 
likely.’’ Cukierman et al. (1992) 
 
 
2. 1. Introducing the Central Bank Independence 
Until three decades ago, Central Banks were regarded as an integral part of 
the Government’s central policy-making. The phrase, ‘the Monetary Authorities’, 
was invented and used to describe the combined operations of the Central Banks and 
Treasury, under the political leadership of Chancellor/Treasurer and Prime Minister. 
That is, the idea that a Central Bank might or should be independent of Central 
Government simply is a phenomenon of the 1990s in most countries.  
Central Banks in a wide variety of countries, from South Africa to New 
Zealand, or from Japan to Turkey have already been given formal constitutional 
independence from the executive branch of government. Similarly, the statutes of the 
European Central Bank are modeled on those of the Bundesbank which is 
historically accepted as the most independent of all Central Banks.  
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Why has this support for the concept of an independent Central Bank recently 
occurred? For explaining this trend, in this section of our study we would relate the 
exercise with improving economic performance in the world, with the basic ideas 
which have driven the case of independence by economic theory. Before these 
macroeconomic inclinations, at the beginning of this section I would like to focus on 
measurements and definitions of Central Bank independence. 
 
2.2 Central Bank Independence in Economic Theory  
2.2.1. CBI: Definitions 
CBI has been studied, defined and measured by various authors in different 
ways. The literature concerning this subject can be classified into two groups. One of 
the groups argues how to define CBI and measure it. Second group of studies focuses 
on the macroeconomic indicators that would demonstrate the relations between CBI 
indexes and macroeconomic performance. In those studies, the impacts of CBI on 
inflation and growth are analyzed. Therefore, we will move to different approaches 
to define CBI and their indexations in the following sub-section.  
Most of the definitions related to the CBI seek to clarify the place of Central 
Banks in relations with the governments and commercial banks. To understand the 
nature of these relations first of all, the relations of Central Banks between the 
governments and the commercial banks are scrutinized. Then, we would have an 
overview on the indexes defining the CBI.   
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Governments and Central Banks 
Alan Blinder in “Central Banking in Theory and Practice” (1997) defines the 
Central Bank independence as the Central Bank’s operational and management 
independence from the government. Sylvia Maxfield (1999) expands this definition 
by categorizing the Central Bank independence in two different phases as political 
Independence “FROM” the governments and secondly, the political and economic 
independence “TO” implement economic policies.  
Independence “from” executive branch can be easily associated to the CBs 
relations to the governments. Governments generally have some degree of influence 
over even "independent" Central Banks; in this regard the aim of independence is 
primarily to prevent short-term interference of governments.  
When the history of the relation between Central Banks and Governments is 
analyzed, an inherent tension (Capie, Goodhart, et. al., 1994, p.2) throughout the 
history of Central Banks stemmed from crashing of the desire of CBs for maintaining 
the value of their currency and their function as being banker to the government is 
generally observed. This tension is the basic determinant for the associated 
relationship. Central Banks have been established by an Act of government and have 
been designed as banker to the government. Therefore, governments have a natural 
desire for cheap finance from their own bank. And when the existence of the state is 
threatened, for instance in a war condition, governments have the incentive to force 
the Central Bank to give priority to their immediate needs.   
The issue of the changing relationship between Central Banks and 
governments that intervening the independence notion of the Central Banks have 
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been discussed by Kleineman in his “extraordinary times” article. (2001, p.48) 
Governments have priorities to preserve themselves as the strongest of the state. In 
this regard, war is the main driving factor of government expenditure. The 
government is almost always a large net debtor during and after a major war 
conditions. In these circumstances, an inflation tax whose incidence is inherently 
uncertain is unpopular and governments will have an incentive to prevent it. 
Similarly, according to Capie et. al. (1994) the principal factors influencing 
government-Central Bank relations for almost two centuries were the prevailing 
political conditions (peace, war), the dominant political and economic philosophy of 
the time, as popularity of “independence” notion after the 1980s, and the exchange 
rate regimes. It should also be noted that in practice the nature of this relationship 
also depends to the personalities whatever was on text books or laws. Finally, Omer 
Telman (1994) by underlining that money is the instrument of economy politics by 
being a natural monopoly within a fiat money regime points out that the power on 
money cannot be transferable. For him, the relation between governments and 
Central Banks emerges in this context.  
In order to understand the historical changes, now a brief history of the 
relation has been presented. In the 19th century laissez-faire, the gold standard and 
stable prices encouraged the appearances of independence and a considerable 
independence level has been allowed in those years. With the First World War, 
things have changed. Crises provoked government intervention. But the experience 
of inflation and the return to the peace of a kind brought independence back. Greater 
changes came under the environment of post- Second World War. After a 
government-controlled phase of Central Banks following more inflation, in recent 
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years, while market solutions became more important and intervention is regarded as 
an old-fashioned policy, the independence of CBs became popular.  
Central Banks and Commercial Banks 
To shed light on CBI, the relations between Central Banks and commercial 
banks have to be understood as well. According to the analysis of Kisch and Elkin 
from the early 20th century, Central Banks are necessary for the commercial banks 
which would deposit their cash resources. (Capie et. al., 1994, p.63)  That is to say, 
just as individuals choose to place their deposits in banks, banks also place their own 
deposits in a safe or in a “safest” bank which would be probably established by 
governments. This basic relation indicates to the nature of Central Banks relations to 
the commercial banks. Certainly, to avoid financial instability and the dangers of 
economic problems, some measures are applied in the evolutionary process of the 
relation. Thus, as a “lender of last resort” CB should supervise for financial stability 
and when it’s necessary, they would regulate the banking system.  
However, the nature of this relation also transforms by time. In the first 
phase, the commercial banks accepted the presence of a Central Bank as lender of 
last resort for the health of the banking system. Subsequently, the CBs maintain their 
role with very limited direct regulatory tools, due to the protected self-regulative 
banking system. Recently, under the environment of information technology; 
financial instability and high inflation rates undermined the system. Banks are faced 
to the difficult problems in this era. Many problems of establishing the best 
regulatory and supervisory structure for the financial system, with appropriate 
relations between CBs and commercial banks have not been resolved yet.  
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Freedom “TO” choose policy instruments  
The “to” part of independence involves to have the willpower to choose the 
goals or instruments of economic policy. In this regards, political independence is the 
capacity “to choose the final goal of monetary policy”, whereas economic 
independence is the capacity “to choose the instruments” with which to pursue these 
goals. Similarly, Walsh (1995) emphasized the difference between “goal” and 
“instrument” independence. “Instrument independence” is considered to be an 
important aspect of independence. By contrast, “goal independence” especially for 
inflation targeting countries is not regarded as crucial as the instrument 
independence. 
According to Maxfield (1999), the capacity of the monetary authorities to 
choose the final policy goals is primarily determined by three broad elements which 
are:  
• The procedure of appointing the members of the Central Bank governing 
bodies,  
• The relationship between the bodies of the Central Bank and the government,  
• The formal responsibilities of the Central Bank.  
 
On the other hand, the economic independence is described by,  
• The influence of the government in determining how much to borrow from 
the Central Bank, 
• The nature of the monetary instruments under the control of the Central Bank 
given by two criteria: The ability of the Central Bank to determine the 
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monetary policy independently and the role of the Central Bank in banking 
supervision. 
Beyond the definitions of Central Banking, for the Central Bank 
independence after it became very fashionable, many different definitions and 
measurements are proposed. Among these studies, the methodology of Lavan 
Mahadeva is relevant.(2000) Mahadeva constructed a direct method for 
understanding what independence means to the Central Bankers. His explanations 
relying on the answers of the Central Bankers are definitely relevant. The definition 
seeks to an answer to the question of what independency means to Central Banks and 
bankers. 
To the study, for most Central Bankers, independence is the capacity to set 
instruments and operating procedures. That is to say, absence of factors that 
constrain their ability to set instruments in pursuit of objectives is the primary 
definition of “independence” according to the survey answers. In this respect, the 
answers given by them can be accounted from the most important to the lesser, 
respectively as follows, 
• Independence in operations/ instruments/ policy implementation/ 
fulfillment of goals  
• Existence of statutory objectives / mandate legal capacity 
• Ability to set targets/ objectives/goals  
• Ability to formulate policy  
• Independence from political bodies in general 
• No deficit finance (is stressed by Central Banks of developing 
countries) 
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• Specific rules on senior officials’ terms office 
• Communication without constraint 
In addition to these studies emphasizing on political and economic 
independence, Bade and Parkins and later Cukierman studied on CBI by underlining 
the disparity of legal and actual independence. They invented that actual 
independence varies from legal independence which implies to the relations between 
Central Banks and governments regulated by the laws. For them, actual 
independence is a definition to describe informal relations among the institutions of 
the state. That is, sometimes the actual independence can not be the equivalent of the 
legal independence while in designing economic policy the political power 
configuration matters.  Thus, the focal point in his analysis is their emphasis to 
distinguish de facto/ de jure as an extension of balance of power in politics.  
On the other hand, Posen pointed out that in measurement of CBI there are 
diverse factors such as laws, instruments, targets and government deficit finance and 
each of these factors varies remarkably across countries, time, and circumstances. 
(Mahadeva, 2000, p. 117) For instance, deficit financing is the prominent factor for 
CBI in developing countries.  
2.2.2. CBI: Indexes 
This logical inference has been illustrated by using quantitative economic 
methods. For the purpose of a brief examination, we can categorize the indices used 
in quantitative analyses into four main types: 5 
                                                 
5 The categorization used in this part had been developed from various articles. 
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• Indices that consider legal and institutional characteristics of a Central 
Bank: Bade and Parkin (1982), Alesina (1988), Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini 
(GMT, 1991), and Cukierman (1992). 
• Indices constructed using an estimated generalized country-specific effects 
variable: Eijffinger et al. (1996). 
• Indices that consider the institutional framework of a Central Bank based on 
surveys: Cukierman (1992), Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (CWN, 1992), Fry, 
Julius, Mahadeva, Rogers, and Sterne (FJMRS, 2000). 
• Indices that use the average tenure of the Central Bank governor as a proxy 
for CBI: Cukierman (1992), CWN (1992), de Haan and Kooi (dHK, 2000), and 
Sturm and de Haan (SdH, 2001).  
Furthermore, the main differences across the studies rest on the methods used 
to measure CBI, the sample of countries and the periods. Even though there are some 
studies that question the robustness of the results6, all these indices justifies the 
agreement that a higher level of CBI results in a lower level and variance of inflation 
that it is also stated in macro theory section of this study. 
Unfortunately, the first two types had only been computed for industrialized 
countries, while these two and the survey indices had only been estimated once. The 
turn-over ratio of the Central Bank governor (TOR) has the advantage that it can be 
computed for a larger set of countries and for different periods, so it becomes 
technically possible to use it to construct a time-varying measure of CBI.  
                                                 
6 Schaling (1998) accounts the studies of Posen (1995); de Haan and van’t Hag (1995); 
Fuhrer, (1997) as examples.  
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Freedman constructed a new measure of CBI: the probability that there will 
be a turnover in the Central Bank governor following a government change. CWN 
(1992) state that if Central Bank governors’ turnovers occur either at the same time 
or after a change in the government, this would be an indication of a lower CBI. By 
putting this concept into practice, Cukierman and Webb (1995) developed a measure 
of political vulnerability of the CB by constructing an index that looks at the 
frequency of cases in which the CB governor is replaced after a political transition. 
This vulnerability index is closer to an index of political independence than to legal 
independence. 
 
2.3. CBI and Macroeconomic Performance 
 
When I ask two economists a question, I get two different 
answers, unless one of them is Lord Keynes, in which case I 
get three. Winston Churchill 
 
The last 10–15 years have been characterized by the presence of lower 
inflation in industrialized, transition and developing economies, although Turkey has 
caught up the trend very recently. Looking at a cross-section of 34 countries from the 
data gathered by Fry, it has been observed that median inflation has dropped from 
8.42% in 1980–1989, to 3.28% in 1990–1999, and further stabilized to 2.51% in 
2000–2003. (1996, p.257)What were the main factors behind this trend or what 
factors contributed to this trend in terms of monetary policy? Our concern on 
economic contributions of CBI is shaped around this main focal point.  
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The responsibility of institutions and policy arrangements, at least partially 
has been believed as an explanation for observed anti inflationary tendency. As 
stated by Cukierman (1992) “Institutions cannot absolutely prevent an undesirable 
outcome, nor ensure a desirable one; but the way that they allocate decision-making 
authority within the public sector makes some policy outcomes more probable and 
others less likely.” The impact of Central Bank Independence to macroeconomic 
indicators lies in the institutional arrangements politics. In this regard, beginning 
from the 1980s, several authors have reported a link between the degree of Central 
Bank independence, and the level and variability of inflation. Likewise, in the same 
period, some others have reported similar findings regarding the effects of specific 
elements such as the role of Central Bank transparency and accountability7, the 
impact of inflation targeting regimes, the legal and political environment, the 
adoption of specific exchange rate regimes, the effects of joining a monetary union, 
and other institutional arrangements are associated with policy makers’ preferences 
for inflation stability.  
To have a consensus among economists and to have an ultimate solution to 
solve an economic problem in most cases is not valid as stressed by Churchill, in his 
widely cited quotation above. In other words, in any theoretical debate in economics, 
the arguments from different wings are probably enriched by the hypotheses 
stemming from diverse data and interpretation processes of economists. However, in 
the case of Central Bank independence and its attributed success within the monetary 
policy framework, almost a consensus has emerged. That is, all these aforementioned 
indices tend to tell a similar story: a higher level of CBI is negatively correlated with 
                                                 
7 A brief definition would be given on these terms in the following parts of the section.  
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the level of inflation. The speed of the belief in this institutional feature of CBI is 
astonishing enough that it might be due to the strength of the theory or the lack of an 
anti-thesis on the issue. Now we can step forward to the analyses of CB 
independence as an economic theory to have an understanding about this consensus 
of the literature on the theory and the adaptations processes of various Central Banks 
of the world 
 
2.3.1. The History of the Theory 
How the theory of the relation between CBI and Inflation has been 
developed? 
The first of the basic ideas driving for independence is the vertical Phillips 
curve. Bill Phillips, a New Zealand economist, by using historical British data, had 
discovered in the 1950s that when unemployment was high, the pressure of demand 
in an economy being low, then wage and price inflation had also been lower. This 
suggested that the authorities might be able to choose an optimal combination, or 
tradeoff, between inflation and unemployment in the short run. And this explains 
exactly what governments sought to do in the 1950s and 1960s in the post-war 
conditions. But in the l970s, the cost of lower unemployment, which is a higher 
inflation, made the rate of inflation a chronic disease of world economies with a 
given level of unemployment that means economies ran into stagflation.   
In these circumstances, Milton Friedman then explained that the problem was 
that the short run Phillips curve had depended on the existing level of inflationary 
expectations. If the supposedly optimal level of inflation that the authorities wanted 
was above than the one that had been expected by the public, then the public’s real 
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wage and profit outcomes would have been systematically inflated. They would 
subsequently revise their inflationary expectations up, and at any given level of 
unemployment people would demand higher wage, or price, increases. In short, if the 
authorities tried to keep the level of unemployment below the natural rate, which is, 
broadly, the rate that causes workers to seek that rate of real wage increase that their 
own productivity increases make available, then inflation will not be constant, but 
will rise without limit; that means in economics, in the longer term the Phillips curve 
is vertical, There is no trade-off in the medium, and longer term between inflation on 
the one hand, and output, growth and unemployment on the other. 
The experiences of the Second World War, particularly for the countries that 
troubled as a result of hyperinflation, as in Germany, induced the believes on  
independence of Central Banks. There was no doubt in German minds after the 
Second World War that their new Central Bank must be as independent as possible 
from the political pressures. Since, they had experienced the worthless paper and 
accused of the Government-dominated Central Bank due to the hyper inflation. The 
Deutsche Bundesbank, which was known for its independence, was the institution 
addressed by those minds.  In that context, both economists and governments had 
worked on the basis of such an assumed trade-off between inflation and CBI. 
According to Freedman, the choice of the ‘optimal’ balance between employment 
and inflationary objectives was seen, and then, it became an essentially political 
matter. Consequently, instruments of demand management, monetary and fiscal 
policies, needed to be coordinated and managed to achieve that balanced outcome. 
However, when the concept of the medium-term vertical Phillips curve was 
captivated, it became apparent that one both could, and should, use monetary policy 
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to control inflation in the medium and longer term without losing any benefits in the 
way of growth or employment.  
But, what that implied was that governments should use monetary policy as a 
medium term instrument to control inflation, while using (quasi-automatic) fiscal 
stabilizers, or supply side measures, to moderate shorter term shocks and cycles.  
That does not correspond that the monetary policy instrument should be removed 
altogether from the hands of Ministers. And this is broadly what happened. 
Governments in the 1970s and early 1980s embraced monetary targets and medium-
term financial strategies for bringing down inflation and moved to ‘supply side’ 
measures to encourage growth. 
Thus, by the 1970s Central Banks became more important. 1973 OPEC crisis 
was the basis of the event. By the 1980s under the context of high inflation, budget 
deficits, and the populist policies of governments, Central Bank economists have 
begun to propose independence.  
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Freedman also asserts that this strategy had a “mixed success”. In those years 
at Bundesbank, in UK and at the FED inflation was brought down but often at a 
severe short-term cost in terms of higher unemployment. (Mizen, 2003) In that time, 
these costs were attributed to a lack of credibility that the authorities should maintain 
a regime of stable prices and zero inflation. Indeed, the lack of credibility was 
attributed to the politicians owing to their short time horizons in monetary policies in 
advance of elections. The expansionary monetary policy by increasing money supply 
and the expansionary fiscal policy that is lowering taxes and raising expenditures, 
used by the politicians in a very populist manner. However, in the long term these 
policies do nothing to the output and employment except raising the inflation. In the 
short-run they works, that is, these policies contribute to the rise of employment and 
would provide a feel-good factor that is in turn raises the probability of re-election 
which is so critical for political authority for maintaining its existence. Economists 
regarded that notion as “time inconsistency”. 
Time inconsistency 
Economists incorporated all the policy changes stimulated by politicians into 
a significant model of behaviour, termed “time-inconsistency”. This term refers that 
the government’s rhetoric would always be that its counter-be that its counter-
inflationary determination was absolute. But, whenever short-term pressures really 
increased, or the probability of an election occurred, governments’ actual actions 
would be to accommodate and to encourage monetary expansion as a short-term 
analgesic.  
However, the public would soon appreciate this fake of the governments and 
they would therefore largely ignore and disdain the government’s counter-
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inflationary rhetoric. When it is the case, the medium-term result would be higher 
inflation, no more growth, and a thoroughly cynical set of politicians and electorates. 
For the meantime, the instability of the relationships between monetary 
growth and inflation had made the problem of credibility worse and in turn it led to 
the increasing unpredictability of the velocity of circulation. Previously governments 
could openly pre-commit themselves to a series of monetary targets, which would 
lead straight through to lower nominal incomes and inflation. But these monetary 
relationships progressively collapsed during the 1980s in almost all countries. Hence, 
operations to achieve stable prices reverted from being a matter of fixing in publicly 
announced monetary target rules.  Interest rates had to be varied to try to bring 
inflation back to its desired rate when the interest rate adjustment would have had its 
full effect on expenditures and prices. For Friedman, this exercise requires technical 
expertise, good models of the economy, discretion, patience and long horizons, none 
of which government ministers as a collective, irrespective of personality, party or 
country, have been renowned for possessing. There is no doubt but that the 
popularity of the idea of an independent Central Bank has a generalized distrust of 
politicians of all shapes and sizes. 
Thus, the theory proposed that if there was a need for a credible medium term 
counter inflationary policy, the solution would be an autonomous Central Bank 
which should have both the requisite longer time-horizon and technical expertise to 
achieve that objective. The correspondence of the solution for the government is to 
delegate the objective of achieving price stability to a separate institution. It should 
be noted particularly that here the hypothesis is established for an Independent 
Central Bank with respect to the objectives; for the stated autonomous Central Bank 
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it is possible to be tied down much more rigidly to the achievement of a defined 
outcome. In that sense, the Central Bank is autonomous with respect to the powers 
used to achieve its defined objective, but it might not be independent to choose this 
objective.  
But the move towards an independent or autonomous Central Bank was not 
only a matter of theory. A whole series of econometric/statistical tests have shown 
that countries with more independent Central Banks have had generally lower 
inflation rates as in examples of the Bundesbank for Germany and other countries 
that have adopted independent Central Banks such as Chile and New Zealand has led 
to the success in this adoption as being best performers.  
Finally, but very importantly since 1989, 25 countries have upgraded the 
legal independence of their Central Banks that is remarkable when contrasted with 
the few changes occurred in the previous forty years. (Cukierman, 1998; the trends 
for the changes in the degree of Central Bank independence) In addition, not only the 
Germans were so enamored to their full independent Central Bank but also the 
economists believed that an independent Central Bank as Bundesbank is the best way 
to avoid manipulation of the macroeconomy for political purposes. That is, European 
Central Bank was modeled after, the German Bundesbank. 
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2.3.2. The literature for macro economic performance analysis   
Switching to the applied analysis which would be beyond our study and 
necessitate further technical knowledge on the subject, I would concentrate on the 
literature of the theory and measures of the CBI constructed by several authors over 
the past 20 years for a rough analysis.  
The studies on empirical evidence for CBI and Inflation Performance that 
indicates correlation between lower inflation and CBI are pioneered by the works of 
Kydland and Prescott (1977), and continued with (Barro and Gordon 1983). The 
relationship between inflation and Central Bank independence has also been 
estimated by Bade and Parkin (1982), Grilli et al. (1991), Cukierman (1992), Alesina 
and Summers (1993), Eijffinger and Schaling (1993), and continued with the studies 
of Webb and Neyapti, Franzese (1999), among many others. When we analyzed 
these studies upon Central Bank independence, we would see the main differences 
across the studies rest on the methods used to measure CBI, the sample of countries 
and the periods considered. Even though there are some studies that question the 
robustness of the results, there appears to be general agreement among economists 
that a higher level of CBI results in a lower level and variance of inflation. 
The pioneering empirical study of Bade and Parkin written in 1987 and 
examined 12 countries over the years 1973-1986. They distinguished two types of 
government influence on Central Banks which are; financial type –budget deficits- 
and policy type –monetary policy deciding meetings-. Grilli, Mascandaro and 
Tabellini (GMT) studied five Pasific basin countries and government influence on 
bank appointments in 1988. Similar studies are managed by Aşesina and Summers 
1991, by Cukierman 1992, Webb and Neyapti. Eijffinger-Schaling worked on 
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government influence on appointment procedures and the relationship between 
government ad Central Bank on the determination of monetary policy, legal 
responsibilities of Central Bank, and different rankings in index for different degrees 
of independence in Central Banks. Many of these empirical studies find that Central 
Bank independence and the inflation rate are highly negatively correlated in high-
income countries. The theoretical and empirical results have generally been 
interpreted as supporting the view that effective inflation control requires a high 
degree of Central Bank independence and that greater Central Bank independence is 
always better than less. This reasoning consequently implies that inflation is best 
controlled when Central Banks are granted full independence.  
The empirical result of GMT for the period 1960-1992 indicates that there is a 
significant negative relationship between the average rate of inflation and CBI. 
(Capie et. al., 1994, p. 295) This relationship is very robust for the industrialized 
countries. According to the Cukierman et al. analysis that covers 72 countries there is 
a slightly positive relationship between inflation and legal CBI. For this groups 
Cukierman find that inflation is positively and significantly correlated with the rate 
of turnover of Central Bank governors. The relative contrast between the results for 
the industrialized countries and the larger group must be due to the difference 
between the actual and legal independence. 
The most striking result of the empirical work is that CBI seems to have no 
adverse consequences. GMT  and Alesina and Summers 1993 show that the 
improved inflation performance associated with increased CBI for industrialized 
countries does not cause a cost in growth.  
40 
 
According to Cukierman, the legal position of the Central Bank is hardly 
relevant to inflation performance: if a country is inflation averse then it will have low 
inflation whatever the legal status of the Central Bank. But, if the country is not 
inflation averse, then the political system will always be able to get around the legal 
status of the Central Bank  
Posen (1998) conclude that it was not independence that produced low 
inflation, but rather the institutional, political and historical influences which lay 
behind independence. In his view, independence without these would prove either 
transitory or ineffective. Independence is no more than a symbol that have combined 
to make low inflation desirable.   
Capie, Mills and Wood (1994) looked at longer run of evidence while Briault, 
Haldan and King (1996) by different approaches reached the same conclusion that 
independence lowered inflation. That is, in the case of CBI as we mentioned before 
there exists a significant agreement. Furthermore, International organizations such as 
the World Bank, the BIS and the IMF are strong supporters of Central Bank 
independence. 
Lohmann (1992) is a notable exception. Lohmann finds that when output 
disturbances are sufficiently large, it is to the government’s benefit to restrict the 
Central Bank’s independence. She therefore recommends that the Central Bank 
should be granted full independence under ‘‘normal’’ conditions and only have this 
independence curtailed in times of economic exigency. 
As we mentioned above, there exists convincing evidence suggesting that a 
more independent Central Bank is associated with a lower level and, possibly, a 
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smaller variance of inflation. The main theoretical argument is that CBI contributes 
to reducing (and even eliminating) the inflation-bias problem, whenever the 
appointed Central Bank governor has a particularly high aversion to inflation. It is 
therefore logical to infer that a higher level of CBI should be associated with a higher 
preference for inflation stability.  
 
2.4. Central Bank Independence and Democracy   
The arguments questioning CBI mostly stem from the idea that checks and 
balances have key importance in democracy that the origin of sovereignty for each 
agent stems from even indirectly in the public voting. Thus, Jean-Claude Trichet 
clarifies that “in a democracy, I believe that an independent institution should both 
listen and explain itself.” (Deane and Pringle, 1995, p.14) 
The democratic legitimacy of CBI lays in the question where the actual 
position of Central Banks in democracies is (Kleinmann, 2001) and whether an 
“independent” Central Bank is appropriate in a democracy or not. If so, should an 
independent fiscal authority also be created?  
Maxfield (1999) calls the attention of the readers for the trend toward Central 
Bank independence (CBI) and related debates on this issue. In the first place,  she 
compares the arguments of the advocates and proponents of CBI. On the one side, 
proponents of CBI as U.S. congress members and some of the academicians argues 
that due to their powerful decision-maker position in the “distribution of power and 
wealth”, CBI is undemocratic, contrarily Central Bankers -for instance Carlos 
Ciampi from Italy- respond this argument by underlining the importance of a sound 
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currency to establish a strong and efficient democracy. In addition, it is also argued 
that an autonomous Central Bank can be more democratically accountable than a 
dependent Central Bank. Ironically both sides of the debate argue to preserve or to 
increase their existing power in shaping the policy to be more influential in monetary 
policy design.  
Another criticism on CBI focuses on the execution problems in governing. It 
is claimed that policy making ultimately is a matter of one authority that would 
coordinate the others. For William Grieder, coordination would not emerge when 
there are two drivers in a car. The advocates of the argument also demonstrated the 
negative correlation between CBI and political business cycles.  
One other popular critique of proponents of CBI emphasizes the conservative 
attitudes of Central Bankers on the main target policy. In most cases, they are more 
sensitive on “low-inflation, high-income” policies than the public. However, the 
advocates claim the role of independence in growth policies.  
At this point, to expand our analysis on emerging market economies would 
assist in understanding Turkey. Among the very few studies on these countries, 
Maxfield outcomes are similar to the Cukierman and his colleague’s findings and 
points out the positive correlation between CBI and growth unlike developed 
markets. Even in a worst case scenario, the profits of CBI would omit the costs of 
structural problems regarding to the “wage bargaining system” of that country. For 
industrialized countries with strong unionization, CBI has become crucial to fight 
against inflation. That is, if the Central Bank were more independent, inflation would 
be lower.  
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However, these results must be revised for developing countries. The low 
inflation achieved in the developing countries as in Korea has been experienced 
under a dependent Central Bank in accordance with the absence of a strong 
unionization. As a matter of fact, Brazil and Mexico with more established wage-
bargaining systems were subjected to the high inflation. That is, the relation between 
CBI and union structure has not clearly understood yet. Furthermore, the argument 
against CBI do not addressing the political economic circumstances of these 
countries. As has been in Korea (1987-88) and in Mexico (1993), the regulations 
towards CBI against despotic governments might serve for liberal democracy by 
restraining the power of dictatorships. 
 
2.5. Remarks on Transparency, Accountability, and Credibility  
Before giving an end to our discussion, to avoid confusions in understanding 
the subject, the basic terms in Central Bank Independence literature in meanings, at 
first I would begin with the definitions of some basic terms within the framework of 
the institutional arrangements of Central Banks and would let a broader 
understanding for Central Bank independence. The following terms related to the 
CBs are generally used in control mechanisms of CBI. 
Transparency: Central Bank transparency could be defined as the absence of 
asymmetric information between monetary policymakers and other economic agents. 
This means that it reduces uncertainty and this is often believed to be beneficial 
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(although it need not be)8. Furthermore, transparency may affect the incentives that 
policymakers face to manipulate private sector beliefs through signaling and 
reputation building. (Petra M. Geraats, 1999) 
Accountability:  Accountability which has become increasingly important as 
more and more countries delegate the conduct of monetary policy to independent 
Central Banks. Clearly, some degree of transparency is a necessary condition for 
accountability, but it does not suffice. In his comparison, Geraats compares 
transparency and accountability Transparency refers to mere information disclosure, 
but accountability also involves bearing responsibility for monetary policy actions 
and possibly facing repercussions when policy appears deficient. So, accountability 
directly affects the Central Bank’s incentives, whereas incentive effects of 
transparency only operate indirectly through private sector expectations. 
Accountability may explain why transparency is a relatively recent 
phenomenon that only emerged after Central Bank independence took hold. Thus, it 
is not surprising that there appears to be a strong, positive relation between Central 
Bank independence and transparency across countries. However, there is less 
empirical support for the conjecture that this is due to accountability. Quite to the 
contrary, there is no cross-country relationship between Central Bank independence 
and accountability, and there is only a small positive association between 
accountability and other aspects of transparency. 
                                                 
8 Although the importance of Central Bank independence relatively has long been 
recognized in the academic literature, research in favor of transparency of monetary policy is 
relatively new and largely seems a response to the new best practice in Central Banking. 
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Credibility: a monetary policymaker would be concerned about credibility, 
since credibility concerns people’s beliefs about what policymakers will do in the 
future, not their appraisal of what policymakers have delivered so far. In this respect, 
Central Bank credibility plays a pivotal role in much of the modern literature on 
monetary policy, yet it is difficult to measure or even assess objectively.  Nobel prize 
winners Edward Prescott and Finn Kydland introduced the idea of a “time 
inconsistency problem” into the macroeconomics to represent the fact that 
policymakers sometimes have an incentive to say one thing, but later they do 
something else. One solution to the time inconsistency problem is for policymakers 
to develop a reputation for credibility by recognizing that the long term benefits of 
having reputation exceed the short-run costs. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY (CBRT) 
3.1.The History  
The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) (Türkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez 
Bankası - "TCMB") is the Central Bank of Turkey and is founded as a joint stock 
company on October 1931 and opened officially on January 1932.  
In the Ottoman Empire, the Treasury operations, money and credit 
transactions and the trade in gold and foreign currencies were executed in varying 
degrees by the Treasury, the Mint, jewelers, money lenders, foundations and guilds. 
In 1856, the "Ottoman Bank" was established jointly with French and English capital 
and in 1863, it partly had  the functions of contemporary Central Banking after 
becoming a state bank under the name of "Imperial Ottoman Bank." The Imperial 
Ottoman Bank enjoyed the right and monopoly of issuing banknotes.  
Even though the Republican administration extended the period of privilege 
of the Ottoman Bank until 1935, the preparations had been undertaken to set up a 
Central Bank since 1926. The Law on the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey 
No: 1715 was enacted on June 11, 1930. According to the Law No: 17159, the basic 
aim of the Bank was defined as to support economic development of the country. In 
order to fulfill this aim from 1930 to 1950s, the Bank was given the following duties: 
-To set rediscount ratios and to regulate money markets,  
-To execute Treasury operations,  
                                                 
9 See details online at CBRT’s webpage, www.tcmb.gov.tr 
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-To take, jointly with the Government, all measures to protect the 
value of Turkish currency.  
 
With the introduction of economic development plans in Turkey in the 1960s, 
several changes were made in the Central Bank Law No: 1715. For the same 
purpose, the Law No: 1211, which was enacted on January 26, 1970, redefined the 
duties and responsibilities of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey so as to 
implement the money and credit policy within the framework of development plans.  
The 1980s were the years in all around the world when the liberal economic 
approaches are recognized and the state’s role in market diminished in size. One 
other aspect regarding to the shifts in the markets was the rising of the financial 
sector. This meant that while state and its bank was leaving its direct role in 
economy, Central Banking became critical and much more complex in its role in 
banking sector as a last of resort and as a result of the lessons taken from the 
inflationary outcomes of the former developmentalist policies, Central Banks began 
to pursue anti-inflationist policies. In Turkey, the story was also very similar that the 
1980s became turning point. On the other hand, Turkey experienced financial 
bottlenecks at the end of the 1980s as a result of the growth of the public sector 
deficit that financed through borrowing and monetary expansion.  
In 1989, Turkish Lira became convertible that its value is determined by the 
market. As extension of such policies the 1980s and the 1990s several legislations 
are amended in the law on CBRT to attain anti-inflationary environment.    
The final legislations on the laws are made in 2001 after another financial crisis 
in Turkey which revealed the necessity of new institutional reforms in economic 
48 
 
fields. To this legislation an instrument independency has been pointed out and the 
law (MERK -TC Merkez Bankasi Kanunu/ Central Bank of Republic of Turkey Law, 
2001) provide more independence to the bank. 
According to the legislation enacted in April 2001 (Article 4, Law no. 465110),  
"The primary objective of the Bank shall be to achieve and maintain price 
stability. The Bank shall determine on its own discretion the monetary policy that it 
shall implement and the monetary policy instruments that it is going to use in order 
to achieve and maintain price stability.”  
To the same legislation, fundamental duties of the Bank are as follows: 
• To carry out open market operations 
• To protect the value of Turkish Lira and to establish the exchange rate 
policy 
• To determine the reserve requirements and liquidity requirement 
• To manage the gold and FX reserves of the country 
• To regulate the volume and circulation of Turkish Lira 
• To ensure stability in the financial system and monitor the financial 
markets 
 
Fundamental powers of the Bank are: 
• The exclusive right to issue banknotes in Turkey 
• The right to determine of the inflation target together and implementation 
of monetary policy 
• The privilege to grant advance to the Savings Deposits Insurance Fund 
• The role of lender of the last resort 
                                                 
10 See details in www.tcmb.gov.tr 
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• The power to request necessary information from financial institutions 
 
As long as the main approaches of the current monetary policy were 
summarized, it can be claimed that current monetary program of Turkey is based on 
four major rules and adopted to two principles. Rules are the follows: 1) Public 
sector will not be supported by Central Bank credits 2) Liquidity for markets will be 
created only by foreign currency purchases and open market operations 3) 
Transparency and credibility will be appreciated. And 4) Predictionary approaches 
will be adopted for determination of interest and currency rates. Principles are 1) 
Monetary policy itself is not enough to decrease inflation but can be affective within 
macro politics which are supported by fiscal policies and structural reforms and 2) 
this should be accorded with the fiscal discipline in markets and payment system. 
Based on these major rules and principles, basic instruments of monetary 
policies are short term interest rates, open market operations, reserve requirements 
and overnight repo. 
Serdengecti says that Central Banks should be independent and it could be 
attained through democratic processes. In other words, it is the society which would 
make the Central Bank independent. The Central Bank then aims to provide price 
stability and prosperity of the people. The notion of independence has to be 
embraced by all classes and members of the society. Subsequently, Sureyya 
Serdengecti discusses the independence of the target. “Central Banks in the world 
aim not the goal-independence but target-independence. It has to be clarified whether 
targets will be determined autonomously or together with political will. 
Independence of the instruments that will be used for applying monetary policies is 
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very important for independence of Central Banks.” Responding to the criticisms on 
the target dependence of the Central Bank in European Union’s progress reports, 
Serdengecti mentions that “they criticize us for not having target independence and 
determining the targets with the government. European Central Bank does have 
target independence because they cannot determine a target by consulting to twelve 
other countries. We only need to consult with one government. The situation in 
England and Switzerland is very much like ours.” (2005)  
As seen in the law on CB, the implementation of monetary policy is a duty 
for CB but constitutionally it is stated that (1980 Turkish Constitution, Article 167) 
the state takes measures which performs and improves the sound functioning of the 
money credit, capital goods and services. Thus, constitutionally the goal 
independence is not given to the Central Bank, in other words its ground is the 
instrument independence and the given objective for CBRT is the price stability.  
Price stability can not be maintained by itself in the market. Leaving aside the 
external shocks, there are two factors menacing the price stability. First, the political 
decision makers force the economic conditions by over capacity usage in order to 
increase economic activities. Such a policy is unsustainable. Second, the attitudes of 
the governments to finance budget deficits by using Central Bank’s sources. As a 
result, although in short term growth and employment expansion have been achieved, 
the long term cost would be high inflation, low and volatile growth and employment. 
Thus, the price stability can only be achieved through the implementation of the long 
term, stable and decisive policies. However, in general, political authorities 
stemming from the nature of the politics have short term insights. At this point, 
Central Banks have longer term policies regardless of the political authority in order 
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to control inflation, price stability, then to attain full employment and sustainable 
growth.  Such an independent structure, provides grounds to the Central Banks not to 
implement policies against the price stability and to warn political authorities when it 
seems necessary.  
3.2. Organization of CBRT 
According to the Article 13 of Law No.4651 of April 25, 2001; 
Governing bodies of the Bank are as follows:  
a) General Assembly,  
b) Board,  
c) Monetary Policy Committee,  
d) Auditing Committee,  
e) Office of the Governor,  
f) Executive Committee.      
The duties and powers of the General Assembly is defined that it examines 
the annual report submitted by the Board and the report of the Auditing Committee. 
(Article 15) 
The Board is composed of the Governor and six members to be elected by the 
General Assembly (Article 19) and the members of  the Board are required to have 
received a higher education and to have acquired knowledge and experience in 
banking or in the fields of economics and finance.  The term of office of Board 
members would be three years. One third of Board members shall be renewed each 
year. Members who are to leave the Board at the end of the first and second years 
shall be designated by drawing names. Members whose terms of office have 
52 
 
terminated may be reelected.  (Article 20) the Duties and Powers of the Board are 
basically to “take decisions concerning monetary policy that may be implemented 
and monetary policy instruments which may be utilized in compliance with the 
monetary policy strategy and inflation target, and to set forth regulations and to take 
decisions for, the replacement of banknotes in circulation, as well as their withdrawal 
from circulation and their destruction.”   (Article 22) 
 The Monetary Policy Committee is composed of Vice Governors, a member 
to be elected by and from among the Board members and a member to be appointed 
by a joint decree on the recommendation of the Governor and acts under the 
chairmanship of the Governor. The Monetary Policy basically determines the 
principles and strategy of monetary policy in order to achieve and maintain price 
stability, determine the inflation target together with the Government within the 
framework of the monetary policy strategy. 
3.3. The story of the Independence of CBRT 
When CBRT was established, it was a joint stock in order to isolate it from 
the political pressures. However, throughout the years after the Second World War, 
the Central Bank became the financer for public sector. As mentioned above, the 
1980s were critical in terms of the shifts in the global understanding of Central 
Banking which also affected the policies in Turkey.   
24 January 1980 Stabilization Program aimed that the share of the Central 
Bank of the Republic of Turkey in the financial system was to be lowered to enable 
the financial system in performing its functions soundly. However, the process after 
the 1980 indicated that the regulations could not achieved a sound financial system 
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due to the monetization of the rapidly increasing government deficit. Commonly, in 
order to finance these deficits, governments used the CBRT sources that in turn 
caused to the enormous growing of the balance sheet of the CBRT. In other words, 
the role and the share of the Bank became much more prominent in the financial 
system. In addition, the post-1980 growth policies and then the populisms of the 
governments are financed by borrowing from the CBRT which made the 
achievement of the sound credit policies of the Bank difficult.  
According to Gökbudak, the changes in organizational structure of the CBRT 
which pursued the employment of qualified staffs after 1984 provided greater 
expertise and research to the Bank. In taking decisions, the personnel benefited from 
institutional independence and bear a great responsibility. The main idea behind this 
motivation was the belief that only technically qualified executives can remove the 
influence of political actors in decision making. On the other hand, this expertise 
served to the independence that according to Goodman (1992) Central Banks enjoys 
from a monopoly on expertise possessing a powerful tool in policy disputes. He 
states that in the short run this expertise enables independent Central Banks to set 
policies different from those desired by the government without risk of losing their 
independence. However, in the long run, realizing their vulnerability to political 
threats, Central Bankers accept the accommodation of political demands as a means 
of preventing more complete and durable political control. 
The introductions of institutional changes continued throughout the 1980s. In 
1985 CBRT began to the sale of the Treasury papers (the auction system), in 1986 
the interbank money market has been established and in 1987 open market 
operations has come into practice. The following two years at the end of the 1980s 
54 
 
the gold market and the foreign exchange market began to operations. All these 
reforms and regulations are adopted to contribute the autonomy to the CBRT and the 
necessary instruments to use in a market economy. In this regard, 1989 was a crucial 
year that the convertibility of the Turkish lira is provided and the value of it has 
started to be determined by the market variables.  
The rules to govern “the operations between the Treasury and the CBRT” are 
determined in 1989. This agreement put a limitation to the borrowings of Treasury 
from the CBRT. By Gökbudak, this agreement is regarded significant in terms of 
independence in protection of the national currency. Since Central Banks needs a 
relative detachment from the Treasury.  
Similarly, the 1990 monetary program provided another step forward the 
autonomy of the CBRT. The program announced that; (Gökbudak, 2002, p. 11)  
• CB should not be a part of policies aiming at creating employment. 
• It should not be a means of incentive policies. 
• Its medium term objective must be to provide stability of the domestic and 
external value of TL. 
• Inflation would be controlled.  
However, the announcement of the monetary program would not perform price 
stability due to the financing of the public sector deficits through monetization.  
Throughout the 1990s the Turkish economy was shaped by high and chronic 
fiscal deficits, high inflation rates and a weak institutional environment. The 
economic crisis in Turkey in 2001 was not only the lowest point of the period, but 
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also a major turning point for Turkish economy. Since then a reform agenda under 
four main categories began to be implemented to reach better economic governance: 
(1) Monetary policy, (2) Fiscal policy, (3) Financial stability and (4) Structural 
reforms. 
The responsibilities of Central Bank have evolved parallel to the conditions of 
Turkish economics and alterations in its structure. In the first Turkish Republic 
Central Bank Law which reflected the stagflation of 1930’s, the basic duty of 
Turkish Republic Central Bank was determined as to support the economic 
development of Turkish state. Accordingly, determining the rediscount rates, 
improving the financial markets and protecting the value of Turkish Lira together 
with government are amongst the duties of Central Bank. In the following years, 
Turkish Republic Central Bank Law has been amended mainly to facilitate financing 
public deficit and such amendments enabled treasury and State Economic Enterprises 
to have credits from the Central Bank. However, in recent years with the significance 
of liberal policies and inflation becoming the major problem for economics, the basic 
principle of the Central Bank has been maintaining the price stability which in 
practice means restriction of the credits for public sector rather than supporting the 
economic development. This change has been more significant with two major 
factors. The first factor is the gradual reduction of credits from the Central Bank to 
the government down to 3% of the annual increase in total budget revenues in 5 
years time period after approval of a legislation in 1994 in the parliament. Before the 
reduction the treasury was supported by an opportunity of 15% of total budget 
revenue increase. From that date forward the idea of independence of Turkish 
Republic Central Bank  likewise other modern Central Banks has been popularized. 
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Second factor is the authorization of the Central Bank with restriction and arrest of 
public finance as well as determination of short term interest rates in 1997 following 
a protocol between the Central Bank and Treasury. 
Central Bank independence that was granted by Law in 2001 was the key step 
on the monetary policy side.  Introduction of the free-floating exchange rate regime 
in 2001 and formal inflation targeting regime in 2006 can be classified as the other 
two key steps providing expanding sphere of independence of CBRT. According to 
Durmus Yilmaz, the Governor of CBRT, in the absence of independence, the Central 
Bank of Turkey would not be able to focus on its primary objective of price stability. 
(2008) The inflation targets became the new anchor instead of exchange rates and the 
Central Bank has started using overnight interest rates as the main policy tool to 
reach these targets. 
Establishment of the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency, successful 
implementation of The Banking Sector Restructuring Program and the New Banking 
Law that brought the legal framework with best international practices were also the 
milestones of legal and institutional reform in the financial sector.  
 
3.3.1. Indexation and the Place of CBRT compared to European Central Banks 
In general, the reason for measuring CBI quantitatively by using various 
indicators is to find correlations between the levels of CBI in each country and its 
macroeconomic performance. Similarly, the level of Central Bank independence with 
regard to the political economic bases has measured rarely in Turkey. Instead most of 
the literature on independence of Central Bank of the Turkish Republic focused on 
the relation between CBI and macroeconomic indicators such as inflation, and 
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production. Among very few studies on measurement Kum and Atik measured the 
economic and political independence of CBRT by using the indicators of Grilli, 
Mascriandro and Tabellini to compare the independence index with that of EU 
countries. Their analysis based on the final version of the CB Law which is amended 
in 2001. They calculated the index for political and economic independence as 3 and 
5, respectively (for the values 1 to 6 where 1 is the least independent while 6 
demonstrates to the highest independency).  The measure resulted in that Turkish 
Central Bank has not a huge lack of independency compared to EU countries. (Kum 
and Atik P.11) The table below indicates this comparison that there are volatile 
measurements for the various countries in Europe in terms of political independence. 
According to the table below, Belgium, Portugal and England  have the 
lowest and Holland and Germany have the highest level of independency, while 
Turkey laid at an average level in terms of political independence. The criteria of 
index for political independence are on appointments, government relations, and 
legal status and CBRT performs well at the first two criteria while its relative failure 
in legal legislations.  
58 
 
Table 2. Comparison of Political Independence Turkish and European Countries 
Central Banks 
Countries Appointments 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Government 
Relations 
(5) (6) 
Legal 
Status 
(7) (8) 
Index for 
Political 
Independence 
Austria           * * * 3 
Belgium       *         1 
Denmark   *       * *   3 
France   *   *         2 
Germany   *   * * * * * 6 
Greece     *         * 2 
Ireland   *       * *   3 
Italy * * *   *       4 
Holland   *   * * * * * 6 
Portugal         *       1 
Spain       * *       2 
England         *       1 
Turkey *   *   *       3 
Tha data for EU member countries are based on the period before EMU.  
Source: Hakan Kum, Hayriye Atik, “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Merkez Bankası’ nın 
Bagımsızlıgı: Avrupa Birligi Ülkeleri ile Bir Karsılastırma”, www.iibf.erciyes.edu.tr 
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Table 3. Comparison of Economic Independence Turkish and European Countries 
Central Banks 
Countries Financing 
Budget Deficit 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Monetary 
Instruments 
(6) (7) 
Index for 
Economic 
Independence 
Austria     * * * * ** 6 
Belgium   *   * * * ** 6 
Denmark   *     * * ** 7 
France       * * * ** 5 
Germany * * * * * * * 7 
Greece       *   *   2 
Ireland   * * *   *   4 
Italy       *       1 
Holland *   *   * * * 5 
Portugal       *   *   2 
Spain     * *     * 3 
England * * * *   *   5 
Turkey * *   * * *   5 
*Tha data for EU member countries are based on the period before EMU.  
Source: Hakan Kum, Hayriye Atik, “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Merkez Bankası’ nın 
Bagımsızlıgı: Avrupa Birligi Ülkeleri ile Bir Karsılastırma”, 
www.iibf.erciyes.edu.tr 
The table for indexation of economic independency (1-7) indicates that 
Turkey has better performance in economic independence compared to the political 
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independece that even some EU member countries such as Greece, Spain, Ireland 
and Portugal have lower indexes compared to Turkey.  
Similarly, Sandra Dvorsky (2005) compared the changes in the CB’s legal 
status of the southeastern EU countries in the accession process (Bulgaria, 
Macedonia and Turkey)  to compare their adaptation to the Article 109 of the 
Maastricht Treaty: “Each Member State shall ensure, at the latest at the date of the 
establishment of the ESCB, that its national legislation including the statutes of its 
national Central Bank is compatible with this Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB.” 
and she conclude after the amendments in 2001 Turkey is not in a backward status in 
terms of legal independence. 
The results obtained from the indexes lead that there are further steps to be 
taken in terms of political independence although the reasonable index measurements 
of CBRT, particularly as far as the actual independency which has not been 
concerned in measurements. 
Certainly the indexation measured in these studies does not indicate the actual 
independence of the Central Banks. The practices and the institutional formations 
would illustrate the level of actual independency. Beyond the regulations and the 
shifts in the CBRT law towards institutionally more autonomous and independent 
CB, the law itself could not provide the necessary power to the CBRT especially 
where there exist instabilities and difficulties in macroeconomic structure.  
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3.4. Relations between the Bank and the Government and Relevant Duties  
The relationships and possible conflicts between monetary and fiscal policy 
authorities stemming from the public debt management and Central Bank credit to 
government constitute the linkages between the Central Bank and the Government.  
When legal limits on Central Bank credits to governments are established, 
this does not necessarily mean that the Central Banks will be independent from 
pressure coming from governments which pursue borrowing alternatives. The legal 
limits may not be clearly defined or they do not include all possible forms of 
government debt with the Central Bank. The experiences seen in the 1980s and early 
1990s exemplify such a conflict between fiscal and monetary agencies that cost very 
highly to Turkey and make new legislations on CBI necessary.  
The Central Bank and the government have usual relations while the bank 
acts as Financial and Economic Advisor, Fiscal Agent and Treasurer. According to 
the Article 41 (As amended by Law No. 3291 of May 28, 1986) the bank is the 
financial and economic advisor of the government and submits its opinions 
concerning money and credit policy which are requested by the Government.   
 Secondly, it might act as the fiscal agent of the government in the international 
financial and economic relations of the State.   Moreover, the Bank is the treasurer of 
the Government.   
However, the changes that were provided with the new law enacted in April 
2001 emphasized that the primary objective of the Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey was to achieve and maintain price stability. The Central Bank of the Republic 
of Turkey was prohibited to grant advance and extend credit to the Treasury and 
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public institutions. The Central Bank was also prohibited to purchase debt 
instruments issued by the Treasury and public institutions in the primary market. 
Terms of office of vice governors were extended from 3 years to 5 years. According 
to the former Central Bank Law of 1970, Governors could not be excused from 
office before the  expiration of their terms. With the new law, this  rule also became 
applicable to Vice Governors. Thus, accordance was attained with the second 
paragraph of the Article 14 of European Central Banks’ System Status. Transparency 
and accountability in determination and implementation of monetary policies were 
also enhanced.  
• Legal and Actual Independency  
According to Mahfi Egilmez, social support is important in opposing to the 
politicians. Moreover, the ability of Central Bank to make decisions against the 
market players is not just a legal issue. For instance, Federal Reserve, in comparison 
to Turkish Republic Central Bank has less legal power however it can make more 
independent decisions than CBRT. The key of the difference lays between the legal 
and actual independence. In this regard, institutional legacy of a country along with 
the Chairman’s personal qualities also play a crucial role. Therefore, I attempt to 
understand the actual position of the CBRT in the matrix of political powers from the 
view of the current debates. The following discussions would provide at least an idea 
where the independence of the CBRT lays.  
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3.5.Recent Debates 
3.5.1. Appointments 
As mentioned in the history of the CBRT, the CBI has its legal status in recent years. 
From the previous theoretical and practical analysis it is known that legal 
independence does not correspond to actual independence, particularly in developing 
countries where the practices of laws take even further times. Therefore, in Turkey 
for internalization of the independency of Central Bank would take times and the 
debates on the issue indicate to this fact. For instance, the process of the appointment 
of the new Governor of the CBRT in 2006 became a publicly controversial issue and 
it would be beneficial to analyze the legal procedures on these appointments.  
The Article 25 as amended in 1990 states that the Governor would be 
appointed for a term of five years by a decree of the Council of Ministers and may be 
reappointed at the expiration of this term. The Governor shall be required to have 
received a higher education and to have acquired knowledge and experience in the 
fields of finance, economics and banking. 
As previously stated, according to the 2001 amendments; the term of office of 
Board members would be three years. One third of Board members shall be renewed 
each year. Members who are to leave the Board at the end of the first and second 
years shall be designated by drawing names. Members whose terms of office have 
terminated may be reelected.  (Article 20) 
                 Likewise, according to article 29 (as amended in 2001) Four Vice 
Governors shall be appointed to assist the Governor. Vice Governors shall be 
appointed by a joint decree for a period of five years on the     recommendation of the 
Governor from among persons who have received a bachelors or a masters degree 
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and acquired adequate knowledge and experience in one of the fields of law, finance, 
economics, business administration and banking and have worked in their 
professions for at least ten years. Vice Governors may be reappointed at the 
expiration of this term. Monetary Policy Committee membership finishes when the 
term of office of the Governor, Vice Governor and the Board member comes to an 
end. The member is appointed by a joint decree and the term of office of this member 
is five years. (Article 22/A)   
Ali Babacan, ex-Minister of Economy expressed the criteria for the 
appointments as follows: “We are focusing on education and technical competence in 
people who also have our complete confidence.” Because of politics, there have been 
continuous delays in appointing the Governor and vice governors. These delays 
cause small scale crisis, however, Ali Babacan responds by saying “Previous 
governments also went through similar stages”. The conclusion that can be drawn 
here is “this is seen as a political issue and therefore the delays and controversies in 
our appointments are natural.”  
The following table illustrates the frequency of the change in the 
Governorship of the Bank and the terms in office were given. As seen in the table, in 
the instable political economic environment of the end of the 1980s and the 1990s in 
the ten years from 1984 to 1995, four governors were charged with. 
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Table 4. Governors of CBRT and their terms of office 
%ames The term of office (**) 
Selahattin ÇAM 1931-1938 
A. Kemal Zaim SUNEL 1938-1949 
Mehmet Sadi BEKTER 1949-1950 
Osman Nuri GÖVER 1951-1953 
Mustafa Nail GĐDEL 1953-1960 
Memduh AYTÜR 1960 
Đbrahim Münir MOSTAR 1960-1962 
Ziyaettin KAYLA 1963-1966 
Mehmet Naim TALU 1967-1971 
Mehduh GÜPGÜPOĞLU 1972-1975 
Cafer Tayyar SADIKLAR 1976-1978 
Đ.Hakkı AYDINOĞLU 1978-1981 
Osman ŞIKLAR 1981-1984 
Yavuz CANEVĐ 1984-1986 
Dr. Rüşdü SARACOGLU 1987-1993 
Dr. N.Bülent GÜLTEKĐN 1993-1994 
Şakir Yaman TÖRÜNER 1994-1995 
Süleyman Gazi ERÇEL 1996-2001 
N.Süreyya SERDENGEÇTĐ 2001-2006 
Durmuş YILMAZ 18 isan 2006 -  
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The other issue is the election/appointment of Board Members and General 
Assembly of the Central Bank. The members are inclined to be influenced by the 
government because of the duration of their appointments/memberships and this has 
been criticized in EU Progress reports. Indeed, as of 2005, all board members are 
replaced since 2002 elections. This also brings up the political influence issue in 
internal appointments/promotions. In addition, according to Ugur Gurses, while 
experienced staff is pacified, the newly appointed people took active positions.  The 
result is the loss of credibility of the Central Bank.  
To rectify this situation, board membership term has to be extended like in 
Europe and their reappointment has to be banned, hence cutting of their dependence 
on politics. In European Central Bank, these memberships are for eight years and 
since reappointment is not possible, there is no anxiety for the members to get on 
well with the politicians. 
 
3.5.2. Istanbul & Ankara 
According to the Article 2 of MERK as amended by Law No.3098 of 
December 6, 1984, the head office of the Central Bank is in Ankara.  In recent years, 
one of the debates regarding to the CBI aroused from the attempts to move the 
headquarters of CBRT from Ankara to Istanbul. As stated above, according to the 
related legislation No: 1211, CBRT was founded in Ankara. However, the 
governments intended to change its location not only because their believes that this 
move would contribute to Istanbul in being a finance center, but also they claim that 
the move would help to the independence of the bank by restricting the pressures of 
the government intensified in capital city. Although the argument is controversial, 
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Tietmeyer (1994) justifies that geographical location has key importance in Central 
Bank’s independence. For him, the geographical distance between the site of Federal 
Government (Bonn) and the site of the Bundesbank (Frankfurt) is one factor of 
independence achieved by this bank. Such a location prevented strong informal 
channels of influence between government and the Central Bankers. Therefore, the 
Bundesbank remained in Frankfurt even when the government should have moved to 
Berlin. In Turkey, Mahfi Egilmez believes that settling the Central Bank in Istanbul 
might contribute to the actual independence of the Bank by isolating it from the 
political pressures and the bureaucratic atmosphere .(Radikal, 8/8/06) 
 However, opponents of the argument claim that in a highly globalized world 
where communicative tools annulled the authority of the geography, it is 
meaningless to move the Central Bank from one province to another. For Gurses, the 
issue has two dimensions; one is an economic debate while the second dimension 
should be management of the decision making process. The decision has to be 
evaluated within instrument independence and the Central Bank should make 
decisions based on its own researches and reports. (09/08/2006) He also regarded the 
subject of being odd that the issue has been discussed by everyone except the 
respondent Central Bank which this situation lowers its credibility. (16/01/2008) The 
case seems as a power demonstration since its against the will of the Central Bank or 
without its knowledge. (16/01/2008) “You are independent, unless you obey my 
orders” is the way how the government evaluated the position of the CB. 
(09/10/2006)  
It is significant that at the debates the Governor and the members of the 
CBRT remained passive. Therefore, the style of the speeches of the Prime Minister 
Erdogan, the representative of the political authority, has been evaluated as an 
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extension of attitudes to limit the independent institutions. (14/01/2008 Gurses, 
Berksoy ) He clearly expressed that the government made their decision on this 
subject.  Likewise, Durmus Yilmaz acts recessively and for instance he says “we 
have to obey the decisions of the Parliament regardless of what we really wanted to.” 
(2008) 
Asaf Savas Akat expands the debate on the question of the pressure from the 
financial groups by claiming that under the communicative tools and transportation 
facilities of today, this debate is no longer challenging.  (15 January 2008)  It is 
certain that as the banker of the banks, Central Bank would face more pressures from 
the financial agents in Istanbul which planned to be a center for finance.  
 
3.5.3. Communication and Transparency  
Communication tools of the Central Bank have played a key role in explaining the 
price developments and the monetary policy outlook to the public and also in 
managing expectations. For Durmus Yilmaz, the Governor of the CBRT, the Bank’s 
communication policy has become more effective over time with the introduction of 
new communication tools, such as the quarterly inflation reports since 2006, the bi-
annual financial stability report since 2005 and the monthly price development 
reports since July 2006. (Speech, April 2008) In addition, a summary of Monetary 
Policy Committee meetings are published on the website within 8 business days 
following the Committee meeting, simultaneously in English and Turkish. However, 
Ugur Gurses criticized the banks communication tools in a qualitative approach. To 
him, the new communicative tolls, the reports, are all confusing in their contents and 
always have sentences to interpret differently. (“Iletisim”, Radikal, 08.2007) Making 
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hesitant statements in Monetary Policy Committee reports and announcements 
because of the executives who want to politically align with the government are the 
mistakes of the communications policy. Ugur Gurses criticizes the insufficient 
communication efforts of the Central Bank and argues that he can see an apolitical 
shadow cast on the texts prepared by the Central Bank. (Radikal, 18/06/2007) 
Similarly, Taner Berksoy says that it is necessary to read between lines of the reports 
published by the Central Bank to understand their real intentions. (17/06/2006)  
According to Gurses, while Central Bank is firm about their policies against public, 
they constantly feel the need to be diplomatically while advising to the government. 
(01/11/2006) 
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CONCLUSION 
  If men were angels, no governments would be 
necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal 
controls on government which is to be administered by men over men, 
the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to 
control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. 
A dependence on the people is no doubt the primary control on the 
government: but experience has taught mankind the necessity of 
auxiliary precautions. The Federalist Papers, No. 51 
 
Among a number of reasons for studying on Central Bank Independence, two of 
which were worth to be leaded: The great consensus which could be seen 
occasionally in the field of economics and more enthusiastically the power 
configurations emerged within political economic and institutional understandings of 
money. Therefore, the dimensions of money and the Central Banking concerned at 
the latter have become the subjects of the first chapter of this study while the former 
macroeconomic analyses have been scrutinized in the second chapter and 
consequently, both of which have been exhibited in the context of the Central Bank 
of the Turkish Republic. In this study, CBI is evaluated within its political economic 
dimensions beyond being a monetary policy preference.  
Strengthening the fact that Central Banks are intrinsically political agencies, 
the past experiences make it evident that granting greater autonomy to Central Banks 
depends on the particular constellation of political-economic forces, in any given 
national context. The specific constellation of these forces and the balance of power 
among them are structured by the inherited institutional organization of the state 
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system as well as the increasing globalization of financial markets and related crisis 
of national governance. Thus, the development of the idea of Central Banking and 
the institutional features of the ‘money’ discussed in the first chapter of the study. In 
this regard, the vital importance of the legal legislations and basis has been 
emphasized for a sound economic order. Since, the theories of macroeconomics, its 
political predictions and suggestions would not work in an inappropriate legal and 
institutional structure. 
A criticism of CBI focuses on the sovereignty of the states. The independence 
given to the Central Banks has been interpreted as the loss of independence for the 
nation states due to the unavoidability of the implementation of contradictory 
policies while there exist international agents. Such criticisms are reflected by anti 
capitalist side to the CBI. In this view, the CBI has been evaluated as a new stage of 
the diminishing role of the state in capitalist world economy. For Öncü and Köse, 
nation states lost their sovereignty by transferring their control over money to the 
capitalists groups and international capitalist institutions. (Öncü and Köse, 2005) If 
money is a political and social contact as well as a medium of exchange, then, a 
government which transmitted their political control on their money would mean to 
lose the fundamental principles of their sovereignty.  
However, the change in the understanding of the national governance such as 
the ascent of more market-oriented policies along with the lessons taken from global 
financial developments after the Second World War have been reflected to the macro 
theory that gave a rise to the confidence for the necessity of the new monetary 
approaches such as the necessity of technical capabilities as well as the independence 
of the monetary agents. The second chapter of the study dealt with concerning 
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arguments debated within the macro theory stems from anti-inflationary policy 
demands for Central Bank independence and the historical development of these 
theories.  
Experiences from the history enabled thoughts on independence of 
governmental agents to stand in the forefront. The process of globalization and 
market orientation limited the uncontrolled power of the national governments. 
Furthermore, the increased volatility and complexity of international financial 
markets gave a rise to the more restrictions on the decisional autonomy of national 
governments. This has been a major factor in providing both the intellectual rationale 
for and political impetus behind the argument for Central Bank independence. 
Similar to the world trends, in Turkey, as in several countries, implementing 
increased independence reforms has occurred EU accession process of the country 
also made future Central Bank reforms necessary on the basis of transparency.  
The difference of monetary policy outstands by its nature; first it requires a 
very long time for its gestation, which is longer than politicians’ time horizons, and 
second, the “technology” of this policy and its technical characteristics are not well 
understood by politicians or the public. The “technology” of monetary policy makes 
it generally subject to abuse. More specifically, politicians are inclined to make use 
of the ease of expanding the money supply for its costless short-run term gains, 
however, it often results the long and uncertain lags till the costs become apparent. 
These characteristics of monetary policy imply that better outcomes may be achieved 
by putting decision making control in the hands of an independent monetary 
authority.  
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The evident proves that aforementioned abuse of monetary instruments more 
clearly draws the characteristics of the relations between the governments and 
monetary agents in developing countries.  Due to the fact that in many developing 
countries, monetary policy has been dominated by fiscal pressures, governments tend 
to finance their deficits through borrowing from the Central Bank at zero cost. In this 
regard, the evidence proves that the more a government uses the country’s financial 
system to finance its deficit, the less independent will be the Central Bank. As the 
CBRT experience exhibits, for a monetary target, the Central Bank of an open 
economy seeks domestic credit contradiction. Whenever, there is inflationary 
government expansions, the Central Bank could operate by squeezing the private 
sector. When actual independency is matter, the reason why the credits to the private 
sector are reduced would be announced by the bank in order to punish the 
government. Hence, an independent Central Bank may exert indirect pressures on the 
government and would stand as an auxiliary precaution for the control of the 
government. However, the observations from the CBRT and the debates over it 
verify that there are steps to be taken in the pursuit of actual independence which 
would remove the veils of politician on decisions of the Central Bankers even though 
a long way has been covered along with the amendments in legal independence 
during EU accession period. 
Central Banks which are also stated institutions promoting domestic 
economic stability also act as politically to build up their own image and resources in 
order to increase its political support within government and society through raising 
its credibility. Therefore, the study at hand emphasized that though Central Bank 
independence is widely accepted on economic grounds, its political status is more 
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problematic. A vast literature on the macroeconomic theory, specifically on the 
Central Bank Independence, it has been concluded that the issue remains political in 
that the move towards greater autonomy and full “independence” involves a 
redistribution of power over key areas of macroeconomic decision. Hence, according 
to the political economy approach, the current interest in Central Bank independence 
may not only be symptom of an emergent crisis of governance but also of an 
emergent crisis of democracy. (Drazen, 2002)  
The tension of the coexistence of Central Bank independence within 
democratic system has been widely argued. This is a tension between making policy 
responsive to the popular will, seen as fundamental to democracy; and insulating 
policy from the popular will, seen as essential to good monetary policy as argued in 
macro theory. In other words, there exists a crucial contradiction between the politics 
of insulation represented by the notion of Central Bank “independence” and the 
politics of accountability which claimed base to democratic systems of government. 
Incidentally, this study argued that the conflict between popular sovereignty and 
policymaker independence is not unique to monetary policy; contrarily it 
characterizes most policymaking in a democracy. Moreover, institutions that are 
associated with democracies have been created specifically to address such conflicts. 
In this regard, as emphasized that money is an institution which would be contractual 
in transactions, shapes the roles of the sides in societies, we lead to the crucial 
position of the Central Banking and its political significance.  
As last words on the independence notion of the Central Banks, I would like 
to mention the quoted statement at the beginning of this section explaining the nature 
of the governmental agents by underlining why the checks and balances are 
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significant in a democratic system. Thus, Central Bank independence as macro 
theory addressed would contribute to the economic well being as well as to the sound 
distribution of the power in a state, however, it is the fact that each autonomy in a 
democracy should provide confidence through accountability and transparency. 
Consequently, in a democratic system Central Banks cannot be fully independent. 
Legislative and constitutional amendments would always change the status of 
Central Banks and its independence with regard to the realm of the monetary thought 
of the time in additions to the political and economic environment as well as personal 
capabilities of the managers would affect to the formation of Central Banks. The 
main point here would be the institutional establishment and their strength which 
provide confidence for the agents in a political economic structure. Such a 
confidence is the outcome of the credible institutions in town.  
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